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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to the proceeding are set forth in the caption to the appeal. They are: 
Paul Gardner, individually and doing business as NUF Corporation; 
NUF Corporation, a Utah Corporation; 
Kenneth Madsen; 
Marilyn Madsen; and 
Nauti Lady L.C., a limited partnership. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-29-3(2)(k) 
V. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations that are 
determinative of the appeal which are not cited in Appellants' Brief 
yjL 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a contract claim for damages resulting from defendants' denial to 
plaintiffs of use of a houseboat at Lake Powell, and for a determination of ownership in said 
houseboat 
Plaintiffs claimed at trial that on June 15, 1990 Defendants Kenneth and Marilyn Madsen 
sold to them a ten percent (10%) interest in a houseboat mooied at Lake Powell named the Nauti 
Lady and agreed to allow Plaintiffs six (6) weeks use of the boat each summer Plaintiffs claimed 
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subsequent negotiations increased the six (6) weeks to seven (7) weeks. 
Plaintiffs claimed that from 1990 to 1993 they were denied some of the weeks to which 
they were entitled and that in 1993, they were told they could no longer use the boat Plaintiffs 
had no use of the boat from July 1993 to the date of trial. 
In 1993, the Madsens assigned their interest in the boat to a limited partnership known as 
the Nauti Lady Limited Partnership, which partnership Plaintiff claimed participated in denying 
Plaintiff access to the boat from 1993 to the date of trial. 
Plaintiffs filed suit claiming breach of contract and asked for damages and a determination 
of ownership rights to the boat Defendants defended claiming none of the named Plaintiffs had 
any interest in the contract or alternatively, the contract was void. Following a two day bench 
trial, the trial court, Honorable Homer Wilkinson presiding, found the issues in favor of Plaintiff 
and entered judgment awarding an interest in the boat and money damages together with costs 
and attorney fees. Defendants timely filed this appeal. 
Following the filing of the appeal, Defendants moved to disqualify Judge Wilkinson and 
for a new trial claiming a family relationship between the judge and a party in interest in the case. 
V1L 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In addition to the facts set forth in the Appellants' Brief, the following facts are pertinent 
to the appeal. 
1. On June 15, 1990 Paul Gardner paid ten thousand dollars to Kenneth and Marilyn 
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Madsen for a ten percent (10%) ownership right in a houseboat known as the Nauti Lady. See 
Exhibit 13; TR 1 at pp. 38, 83, 121-125, 188-189. 
2. While Mr. Gardner listed NUF, Inc. as the title holder, he considered himself (as owner 
of NUF, Inc.) as the owner of the boat. Id. 
3. Throughout the history of the contract the Madsens treated Paul Gardner personally as 
the owner of the interest in the boat and all correspondence was sent to Paul Gardner personally, 
not to NUF. Inc. TR 1 pp. 35-37 (came to Paul Gardner for expense money), 40-41 (Paul 
Gardner paid the $100 per month due on expenses), 46-57 (Gardner making repairs and 
payments), Exhibits 23, 24, 29 (correspondence to Paul Gardner, not NUF, Inc.). 
4. The Madsens and Mr. Crist, representing the Nauti Lady Partnership, dealt with Paul 
Gardner personally on matters dealing with the boat. E.g. TR 1 pp. 46-57, 63-66, 83. See Ex 23, 
24, 29. 
5. Prior to the formation of the Nauti Lady Partnership, the proposed principles of the 
partnership were aware of the Gardner interest. TR 1 pp. 69-70. 
6. As a part of the boat contract, Paul Gardner was to receive six summer weeks each 
calendar year. See Ex. 11, p.2 (copy attached to appellants appendix, labeled Exhibit B), TR 1 p. 
104. 
7. Gardner testified this six week period was changed to seven weeks to compensate 
Gardner for not providing jet skis. See TR 1 pp. 67-69. 
8. Sometime in early 1993, Madsens transferred most of their ownership rights in the 
Nauti Lady to the partnership known as Nauti Lady Ltd. See TR 1 pp. 69-72, 81-82, Ex. 23, 24. 
9. Mr. Gardner testified he was denied his full six weeks use of the boat each year from 
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1990 to 1995. TR lpp. 64-65. 
10. Mr Gardner testified he was entitled to seven weeks per year in all years 1990 
through 1995 inclusive (six years). TR 1 p. 75. 
11. When Defendants became aware at trail that Clayton Wilkinson was a business 
associate of Paul Gardner (Appellants Brief at p. 18-19) no steps were taken to attempt to 
investigate any possible relationship of Clayton Wilkinson to the trail judge or to disqualify Judge 
Wilkinson until long after he had ruled on the merits of the case. 
12. Clayton Wilkinson has no interest of any kind in any plaintiff in this action, nor does 
he have any interest in the outcome. See affidavits R 361-368. 
vni. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES .WDICATA 
Defendants' claim a prior suit, NUF. Inc. v. Madesen. et. aL civil no. 930903925 which 
was dismissed by Judge Frederick on jurisdictional grounds (a dissolved corporation cannot bring 
suit) precluded that present litigation. Under the test set forth in Jones. Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough v. Dawson. 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1996) the test for applying res judicata is not 
met because there was no judgment on the merits following a full and complete hearing on the 
merits. In addition there was no identity of parties. The failure of these two requirements 
precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata. 
4 
POINT n 
DEFENDANTS HAVE SHOWN NO PROPER BASIS FOR OVERTURNING THE 
LOWER COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
The factual findings of a trial court are presumed correct. College Irr. Co. v. Logan River 
& Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co.. 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989). To overturn such findings Defendants 
must marshal the evidence and show that, taken in the light most favorable to supporting the trial 
court's findings, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict or that the findings are clearly 
erroneous. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989); Schindler v. 
Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah 1989); Gilmore v. Cummings. 904 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 1995) cert. 
den. 013 P.2d 749 (1996). Defendants have failed to meet this burden which is fatal to their 
claim. Id., see also Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co.. 846 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1993) cert. 
den. 857 P.2d 948 (1993). 
POINT m 
THE COURT'S LEGAL RULINGS ON THE CONTRACT ISSUES WERE PROPERLY 
MADE 
The trial court properly found on the evidence that the parties to the contract had treated 
Paul Gardner as the owner of the boat interest notwithstanding the insertion of NUF, Inc. as the 
owner on the contract. The facts showed an assignment to Paul Gardner and that the parties 
always treated Paul Gardner as the owner. The Defendants failed to marshal the evidence to 
show such findings to be erroneous. Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co.. supra. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR DISQUALIFYING THE TRAIL JUDGE 
The evidence showed there was no basis for disqualifying the trial judge. The nephew of 
Judge Wilkinson had no interest in the litigation and was not a plaintiff nor had he an interest in 
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the plaintiff corporation. The standard set out in Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 830 
P 2d 252 (Utah 1992) was not met and there is no legal basis to disqualify the trial judge. In 
addition, failure to timely raise the issue acts as a waiver. 
POINT V 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED TO PLATNTTFFS / APPELLANTS 
There is no basis in law for awarding attorneys fees and costs to Defendants. Plaintiffs 
were awarded attorney's fees and costs at trial under the contract. If Plaintiffs win on appeal, 
attorney's fees and costs of appeal should be awarded on appeal. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
A Background 
There is no issue in this case that the corporation NUF, Inc. which is referred to 
throughout appellants' brief as "NUF 1" (civil no. 930903925), was incorporated in 1988 and 
dissolved on May 1, 1990. See R. 161; Appellants' Brief at 5-6. 
In the case before Judge Frederick, which is referred to by appellants as "the first case" 
(Appellants Brief p.4 at 2(a)), the plaintiff was NUF 1. Judge Frederick treated defendants' 
motion to dismiss that case as a summary judgement and dismissed the suit on the grounds that 
there was no standing to sue. (See Appendix Ex. A & B, Defendant's motion and Court's ruling). 
On August 12, 1993, a new corporation known as NUF, Inc. Was formed by Paul 
Gardner. This corporation is referred to herein as CCNUF 2" and is the plaintiff herein. None of 
the parties to the present suit were parties to the suit in NUF 1 and in fact, the corporate plaintiff 
herein (NUF 2) did not even exist when NUF 1 was filed. 
B Argument 
Citing Jones. Waldo. Holbrook and McDonough v Dawson. 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
(1966) defendants note the four tests to be applied in determining whether the issue preclusion 
branch of the doctrine of res judicata applies in a given case. They are: 
a) the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and the case at hand; 
b) the issue must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous 
action; 
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c) the issue must have been completely, fully and fairly litigated in the previous action; 
and 
d) the party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must have 
been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. 
298 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4 (citations omitted). 
Defendants5 argument that the present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
simply has no merit and the trial court was correct in so ruling. NUF 1 was resolved on a motion 
to dismiss filed at the onset of the litigation and prior to discovery on the issues. The claimed 
basis for the motion was "plaintiff is not a valid legal entity to pursue an action in the courts of 
this state". See Motion to Dismiss and for attorney's fees, case no. 930903925 and attachments 
(Appendix Ex. A). 
Because of the consideration of matters outside the complaint such as affidavits, the court 
treated the motion to dismiss in NUF 1 as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. The court 
granted the motion without comment on its reasoning. See order (appendix Ex. B). 
The only issue before the court in NUF 1 was whether NUF 1 had standing to sue in the 
courts of Utah. The only issue decided by Judge Frederick was whether NUF 1 had standing to 
sue. He decided it did not. No other issues were before the court. The case was not decided on 
its merits, but on a jurisdictional issue. On the res judicata issue, the court in the Jones, Waldo 
case stated: 
Issue preclusion arises in a second action on the basis of a prior decision when the 
same "issue" is involved in both actions; the issue was "actually litigated" in the 
first action, after a full and fair opportunity for litigation, and the issue was actually 
decided by a sufficiently final and valid disposition on the merits. 
298 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. 
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The court went on the hold in Jones. Waldo that while an issue may be litigated as it pertains to 
one party, issue preclusion does not apply to a different party who may have similar but not 
identical claims. Id at 11. 
In this case none of the present plaintiffs were parties to the previous litigation. The 
plaintiff in NUF 1 is not a party to this action. The corporate plaintiff in the present case, NUF, 
Inc., formed in 1993, is a separate corporation from NUF 1. The requirement that the party 
against whom collateral estoppel is invoked must be a party or privy to a party in the prior action 
does not exist. However, the more critical element missing from this case is the requirement that 
the issues must have been completely, fully and fairly litigated in the previous action. 
There was no "litigation" of any of the pertinent facts in this case in the prior case which 
was decided on a motion to dismiss on a jurisdictional issue. The test set out in Jones. Waldo. 
supra, has not been met. There was no showing by defendant in this case that the issues other 
than jurisdiction were "actually litigated" in NUF 1 after "a full and fair opportunity for litigation" 
as required by law. Jones. Waldo supra. For this reason Judge Wilkinson properly refused to 
dismiss the case on the basis of res judicata and this court should affirm that ruling. 
POINT n 
DEFENDANTS HAVE SHOWN NO PROPER BASIS FOR OVERTURNING THE 
LOWER COURTS FACTUAL FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
A. Background 
Based upon the testimony at trial, the court found that plaintiff Paul Gardner had 
purchased an interest in the Nauti Lady houseboat from defendants Kenneth and Marilyn Madsen 
who had later assigned the bulk of their interest to the Nauti Lady Limited Partnership. The court 
9 
found the facts to support plaintiffs5 claims and awarded judgment appropriately See Judges 
Bench Ruling, Appendix C to appellant's brief, and Judgment R 380-416. Based upon the trial 
testimony the court ruled that any rights NUF 1 may have had in the contract were assigned to 
Mr. Gardner. See court ruling at 3:9-24. Clearly, a corporation, as part of its wind up phase, has 
the right to assign rights to its assets or otherwise dispose of them. Utah Code Annotated §16-
10-101 (1953 as amended). 
Having determined Mr. Gardner had a valid contract (Ruling p. 4.6-8) and that he had the 
right to sue on the contract Id., the court then proceeded to find that the facts supported 
plaintiff's claim. The contract was ambiguous and subject to interpretation based on the evidence. 
Ruling at 4-6 Having determined the parties had a valid and enforceable contract, the court then 
sorted through disputed and often contradictory testimony to find the facts, which findings 
supported plaintiffs claim of damages and the amount thereof Ruling at 6-16. 
At points II through IV of their brief, defendants argue that the court erred in finding that 
plaintiff Paul Gardner had a claim against Defendants (Point II), that any attempt to assign rights 
held by NUF 1 was void (Point III) and that the court erred in is calculation of damages (Point 
IV) Because all of these arguments are in fact attacks on the courts factual findings of fact, they 
invoke the same legal principles and will be addressed herein. 
B. Argument 
As a general principle of law, a trial courts findings are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness, and on appeal, the evidence is surveyed in the light most favorable to the court's 
findings. College Irr. Co. V. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co.. 780P.2d 1241 (Utah 
1989). If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the court's findings, they will not 
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be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Id. 
In order to mount a successful attack on a trial court's factual findings, an appellant must 
first Marshal all of the evidence which supports the findings of the trial court and then 
demonstrate to the appellate court that even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
findings, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings or is otherwise clearly erroneous. E.g. 
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance 
Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); Grayson Roper Ltd. V. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 
1989); Harline v. Campbell 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986); Reed v. Reed. 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 
1991). 
As a matter of policy the reviewing court will not substitute its view of the evidence for 
that of the trial court. E.g. Fisher v. Fisher. 907 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1995); Gilmor v. 
Cummings. 904 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 1995) cert. den. 913 P.2d 749 (1996). The reason for this 
position is that the fact-finder is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See 
Homer v.Smith. 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah App. 1993) cert. den. 878 P.2d 1154 (1994); Gilmorv. 
Cummings. supra at 706. 
To show a finding is "clearly erroneous" the evidence must be marshaled and the 
reviewing court must be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
Schindler. supra at 88. 
As the court observed in Gilmore v. Cummings. supra: 
The clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential to the trial court's decision 
because the witnesses and parties appeared before the trial court and the evidence 
is presented there. Thus the trial judge is considered to be in the best position to 
assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceedings as a 
whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record. 
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904 P.2d at 706. 
The duty of the appellant is to Marshal the evidence in the text of his brief. DeBry v. 
Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353, 1360 and footnote 3 (Utah 1994). The failure of an 
appellant to Marshal the facts in his brief and to then demonstrate the facts give no support to the 
judgment is fatal to a claim that the judgment should be overturned. Sparrow v. Tayco 
Construction Co.. 846 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1993) cert. den. 857 P.2d 948 (1993); DeBry. 
supra: Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. supra. As the court in Sparrow stated: 
Moreover, in challenging the court's findings regarding the parties intent, Tayco 
must marshal the evidence supporting these findings and then show how the 
evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are legally insufficient to 
support the findings. Tayco has not done this, instead Tayco has reargued its case. 
Because Tayco has not marshaled the evidence and because the court relied upon 
substantial evidence, we affirm... 846 P.2d at 1328. 
A review of the appellant's "Statement of Relevant Facts" (appellants brief at pp. 5-18) shows no 
attempt to marshal the evidence which supports the trial court's findings and to then demonstrate 
that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the court's findings, is legally insufficient 
to support the findings, or that the findings are clearly erroneous as required by law. Reid. supra; 
Schindler. supra: Sparrow, supra. Instead, as did the appellant in Sparrow, defendants have 
merely reargued their position to this court, the same position and the same arguments that were 
rejected below based upon the factual findings of the court. Such arguments are insufficient to 
allow a reversal in this case. Sparrow. 846 P.2d at 1323. See also Grayson Roper Ltd. V. 
Finlinson. supra; DeBry. supra; Reid. supra. 
The defendants herein fail to recognize a basic tenant of law relating to appeals of a 
judgment entered after trail on the merits of a case: 
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Whether the facts have been found by a jury or a judge, appellants should 
recognize that the burden of overturning factual findings is a heavy one, reflective 
of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts. In re 
Estate of BarteL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Defendants have simply not met their burden. The evidence at trial was hotly disputed on 
most if not all of the relevant issues. The court heard the evidence, made findings as to the 
credibility of the witnesses, ruled on the facts and entered judgment accordingly. Defendants have 
not met the heavy burden required to overturn the judgment. 
POINT m 
THE COURT'S LEGAL RULINGS ON THE CONTRACT ISSUES WHERE PROPERLY 
MADE 
A. Background 
At points II and III of their brief, defendants argue that as a matter of law Paul Gardner 
has no interest in the boat (Point II), and that as a matter of law the contract was void because 
NUF 1 was a dissolved corporation on the date of the contract (Point III). The basis of these 
arguments is the fact that NUF, Inc. appears on the contract as buyer, the terms "husband and 
wife" having been stricken, and that Mr. Gardner signed as an officer of NUF, Inc. coupled with 
the fact that unbeknownst to the parties NUF, Inc. Had been involuntarily dissolved by the state 
on May 1, 1990, some 46 days prior to the date of the contract. 
Defendants have argued below and continue to argue in this court that the above facts 
preclude Mr. Gardner proving he had a personal interest in the boat and that there were oral 
modifications and agreed to written modifications to the boat contract. Throughout the trial there 
was unobjected to evidence that Paul Gardner had a personal interest in the houseboat. Such 
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evidence was not objected to by defendants. E.g. TR.1 at pp. 35-57, 121-125, Defendants, from 
the inception of their contract, dealt with Gardner personally as though he were the interested 
party. E.g. TR 1 pp 35-57, 63-66, 69-70, 78-83. See also Exhibits 23, 24, 29, 37. The testimony 
was that NUF assigned Paul Gardner rights to the boat. TR pp. 123-125, 188-189. The 
testimony was also that Paul Gardner, not NUF, Inc. Paid the money for the boat. TR 1 pp. 38-
41,49-51, 121-123. 
After hearing the testimony of the parties and witnesses, the court ruled on the facts and 
found for plaintiff on the issue of Mr. Gardner having an interest in the boat. 
B. Argument 
It is obvious from the testimony that while the boat was to be titled in NUF, Inc., the 
owner was Paul Gardner. Even prior to his signing the contract on June 15, 1990, it was agreed 
the boat was for Paul Gardner and was so assigned by the corporation. See TR 1 p. 38, 63, 78, 
121-123, 188-189. While Mr. Gardner was unaware of the dissolution when the contract was 
signed, the dissolution had nonetheless occurred. Under Utah law a person acting on behalf of a 
dissolved corporation is personally liable. See Murphy v. Crosland. 886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 
1994). Thus the act of Gardner in signing the contract was is his personal act for which he is 
personally responsible. Id. Given the fact the corporation intended the boat for Paul Gardner's 
personal use, the benefit of the contract as well as the personal liability were his. 
Certainly defendants dealt with the boat and the contract interest as belonging to Gardner. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the proposition that the Madsens had any concern as 
to how the boat was titled. They dealt with Mr. Gardner, took payments from Gardner, not NUF, 
Inc. for the interest in the boat ($10,000 initial payment) and went to Mr. Gardner for all 
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payments due for maintenance and other items. Defendants never corresponded with NUF, Inc. 
about the boat, but dealt only with Paul Gardner personally, as shown by the testimony and 
documents introduced at trial. The Madsens and later Mr. Crist on behalf of the Nauti Lady 
Partnership dealt with Mr. Gardner personally as the owner of the interest. Nowhere in the 
record was there a single instance showing Defendants' corresponded with or dealt with NUF, 
Inc. 
Estoppel principles would preclude defendants, who have always dealt with Paul Gardner 
as an individual owner, from now saying, in effect, there is no owner because NUF, Inc. was 
dissolved. The factual evidence, which was believed by the trial court, supports the finding that 
Gardner was an owner. The failure of defendant to marshal the evidence on Paul Gardners 
personal ownership and then demonstrate the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the 
court findings on this issue, is insufficient to support the findings is fatal to defendant's claims. 
Sparrow, supra; Rdd, supra: Grayson, supra: see also Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 
1985). 
Defendants argument that the contract was void (Point III) is also without merit. The gist 
of defendant's argument is that since NUF, Inc. had been involuntarily dissolved, it could not buy 
the boat interest and therefore the contract was void. Such argument ignores the intent of the 
parties at the time of sale as well as the subsequent acts of the parties ratifying the contract. All 
parties treated Mr. Gardner as the owner of the interest in the boat. 
The titling of the owner under the contract was of no concern to the Madsens who 
originally drafted the agreement to title the boat in Mr. & Mrs. Gardner. When the contract was 
signed the space to fill in Paul and his wife as "husband and wife" was crossed out and NUF, Inc. 
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inserted. However NUF, Inc. did not pay Madsens the $10,000. Paul Gardner paid them with a 
check on another of his corporations. From that time forth Madsens dealt with Paul Gardner 
personally on all matters pertaining to the boat, thereby ratifying the relationship. Madsens dealt 
with Gardner as a personal owner. E.g. TR 1 pp. 35-38, 40-41, 46-47, 49-51, 55-57, 63-66, 83, 
92 and Exhibits 24, 29, 37. 
Again there is ample support for the courts findings and no effort by defendants to meet 
their heavy burden to overturn the courts ruling. See In re estate of BartelL supra: Sparrow v. 
Tayco Construction Co., supra. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR DISQUALIFYING THE TRIAL JUDGE 
A. Background 
Following the trial of the matter, and entry of judgment, defendants filed a motion for a 
new trial and to assign a new trial judge claiming an apparent conflict of interest because the 
judges nephew was claimed to have an interest in the litigation. Such is not the case. See R. 
361-368. The nephew was not a party to the action, had no economic or other interest in the 
action, had no involvement with the corporate plaintiff and was not otherwise shown to have any 
economic or other interest in the outcome of the litigation. See affidavits, R 361-368. 
Defendants produced no evidence to support their claim other than that the nephew was 
involved in some unknown capacity in Probe Realty, a corporation in which Paul Gardner has an 
interest. There is no "partnership" in the legal sense between Mr. Gardner and Mr. Wilkinson, the 
judges nephew. The judge did not believe there was a conflict and did not recuse himself. R. 
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904-905. Defendants made no showing of any basis to believe there was a bias or that the 
nephew had any interest in the litigation, economic or otherwise. 
B. Argument 
Defendants base their claim on the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v Reichert. 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992). Defendants attempt to bring 
this case into the proscription of the Reichert case by erroneously stating: 
In this case Clayton Wilkinson is not an attorney partner in a law firm but is clearly 
a "partner or otherwise an equity participant" in the plaintiff corporation and 
partner with Paul Gardner. Appellants brief at 41. 
The evidence pointed to by defendants is that "[t]he nephew was his [Paul Gardner's] business 
partner in the real estate company". Id. The problem with this argument is twofold: 
1. The real estate company (Probe Realty Corporation) is not a party to this action and has 
no equity interest in this action; and 
2. Clayton Wilkinson is a shareholder in Probe Realty and a "business partner" of Mr. 
Gardner only in the sense that they both own stock in the same corporation. 
This case does not meet the ccbright line" proscription of the Reichart case. Clayton Wilkinson has 
no interest in the plaintiff corporation; has no equity interest in any plaintiff; and has no equity or 
other interest in the outcome of the case. R. 361. Appellants produced no evidence to the 
contrary. Appellants make no claim that Judge Wilkinsons failure to disqualify himself was 
intentional or malicious or that he acted differently than he would have otherwise acted. 
Appellants' brief at 40-41. Defendants did not raise the issue when it came up at trial, but waited 
until after the judge's ruling to raise the issue, thereby waiving any possible claim of bias. 
Absent an allegation that the judge acted with bias and absent a showing of some 
relationship to a party to the action which would violate the ethical cannons, there is no basis for 
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the claim of disqualification. Defendants have totally failed to produce evidence to show any legal 
basis for requiring the disqualification of Judge Wilkinson, 
POINT V. 
ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS 
A. Background 
At Point VI of Appellants' brief, defendants argue they should be awarded their fees and 
costs on appeal The basis of the claim is defendants5 claim this case was brought in bad faith and 
has no merit. Plaintiffs contend that having won at the trial court level and having been awarded 
fees and costs by the trial court, the case not only has merit, but plaintiffs are entitled to fees and 
costs on appeal under the contract. 
B. Argument 
Defendants argue a novel position in asking the court to award attorney's fees. 
Defendants claim entitlement to fees and costs if the court adopts their claim that the contract is 
void and plaintiff cannot recover. See Appellants brief at 44. Defendants admit there is no case-
law to support their position. Id However defendants ask the court to adopt the position that a 
finding in their favor on appeal would show the plaintiffs' claim to be without merit and brought 
in bad faith so as to allow attorney's fees under Utah Code Annotated § 78-26-56. 
This claim has no merit and is of itself arguably sanctionable. The fact plaintiffs prevailed 
at trial negates a claim that the case is without merit. The cases cited at page 44 of Appellants' 
Brief define "without merit" to be frivolous or without a basis in law or fact. 
The trial court in this case found for plaintiffs on both the law and the facts after hearing 
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the evidence at trial. By definition, having won at trial, there is arguable merit to plaintiffs' 
claims. There is simply no merit to defendants' claims as shown by defendants' admission there is 
no case law from any jurisdiction which supports their position. 
On the other hand, the trial court found that under the terms of the contract breached by 
defendants, plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees and costs at trial. Pursuant to such finding 
and based upon the terms of the contract, if the judgment is upheld, plaintiffs should be awarded 
costs and attorney's fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on disputed evidence, the trial court found the issues in this case in favor of the 
appellant. There is ample testimonial and documentary evidence in the case to support the trial 
court's findings. 
Defendants have failed to marshal the evidence and show it incapable of supporting the 
court's findings and have failed to show the court's findings to be clearly erroneous. This Court 
should uphold the judgment for the reasons set forth herein and award costs and attorney's fees 
on appeal to the Plaintiff. 
DATED on this /(f day of April, 1997. 
ADAMSON & SUMM^HAYS 
By Lowell V. Summernays 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
were mailed, postage paid to the following on the ' day of April, 1997. 
Neil B. Crist 
Attorney for Appellant 
380 North 200 West #260 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
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APPENDIX 
INDEX OF APPENDIX 
A. Motion to Dismiss Case 930903925 
B. Order Dismissing Case 930903925 
EXHIBIT A 
NEIL B. CRIST, #0759 
Attorney for Defendants 
380 North 200 West, #214 
Bountiful, Utah 84 010 
Telephone: (801) 298-7200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NUF INC., A Utah Corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
VSe ] 
KENNETH MADSEN and ; 
MARILYN MADSEN, ] 
Defendants. ] 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
) AJSJD FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
| Civil No. 930S03925 
) JUDGE: J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants, through counsel, petition the Court for an order 
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint in this matter on the grounds that 
Plaintiff is not a valid legal entity to pursue an action in the 
Courts of this State 
Defendants are further entitled to an award of their 
attorney's fees incurred and necessitated by the improper filing of 
this action pursuant to RUIP 11 of thp Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in the minimum sum of $2 50. OIL 
This motion is supported by the Affidavit of Counsel and the 
Certificate for the Utah State Department of Commerce, Corporations 
Division both of which are attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference.
 ( ^ 
DATED this &( / day of July, 1993. 
Attorney for Defendants 
COpf 
NEIL B. CRIST 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the fore* 
goinc document to the following individual at £he.address shown, 
via first-class mail, postage prepaid on this '/Tfr^.day of July, 
1993: 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
Attorney at Law 
64 00 Commerce Park 
448 East 6400 South, Suite 314 
Murray, UT 84107 / j 
rA.i Ifeu 
T 
w 
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CERTIFICATION OF 
INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL 
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT 
NUF, INC., 
a Utah corporation, was involuntarily dissolved by this office on 
April 28, 1988}or failure to 
File An Annual Report, 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION. 
File Numbe 
NEIL B. CRIST, #0759 
Attorney for Defendants 
380 North 200 West, #214 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (8 01) 298-7200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT I* AnD FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA: . 
NUF INC., A Utah Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH MADSEN and 
MARILYN MADSEN, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
Neil B. Crist, attorney for Defendant, from first hand 
knowledge of the facts and circumstances set forth herein alleges 
that: 
I am an attorney licensed i -ice law within the 
State of Utah. 
2m in my capacity as an attorney, , contacted the Utah 
State Department of Commerce, Corporations Divia: m, by telephone 
and inquired as to the status of the purported corporation known as 
"Nuf, Inc.". 
3. Based upon tl le information provided to me in the 
normal course of business, it is my opinion that the purported 
corporation is not a viable corporation within the State of Utah, 
and that the same was involuntarily dissolved on May 1, 1990. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
.. -:• 930903925 
JUDGE Dennis Frederick 
4. Based upon further inquiry with the Corporations 
Division, it is further my belief that no action has been taken to 
reinstate the corporation, and that as a result of the length of 
time which has expired, the corporation may not be reinstated. 
5. As a result of the involuntary dissolution of the 
corporation, it is no longer a legal entity and as such has no 
standing to pursue recourse within the judicial system of the 
State. 
DATED this £) / day of July, 1993. 
i W ^ 
NEIL B. CRIST 
Attorney for Defendants 
VERIFICATION 
Personally appeared before me NEIL B. CRIST, who executed the 
above document in my presence after being duly deposed on this 
C r / day of July, 1993. 
,r^ ,'N E. MOONEY 
• ^ ' ^ £ V \ : <TH 200 WEST #214 I 
My (;\<Sp Ami s s i o n ufttwtiiffes© i o • 
1 V f e V ' r.; r .sslon Expires July 22,1995} I — stale of Utah Jj 
u t k i ^ £, Hi 
, ^ ' ^ i ^ M c v I N.QTARY PUBLIC--. r . k K 
/(g>x
 : ^ J ^ g g f ! Residing atl_UiAi_L^ o 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the fore-
going document to the following individual at tta address shown, 
via first-class mail, postage prepaid on this "-^ -T^ I—xday of July, 
1993: 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
Attorney at Law 
640C Commerce Park 
448 last 6400 South, Suite 314 
Murray, UT 84107 
EXHIBIT B 
JUMEMEHT 
NEIL B. CRIST, #0759 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendants 
380 North 200 West, #214 
B o u n t i f u l , Utah 84010 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 298-7200 
By. 
Third Judicial District 
SEP I « 1993 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NUF INC., A Utah Corporation , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH MADSEN and 
MARILYN MADSEN, 
C^ 
ORDER 
'S-^-Cm 
Defendants, 
Civil Nc 930903925 
I JUDGE: 1 Dennis Frederick 
The above matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motiun 
tu Dismiss pursuant to Rule 4-501 et. sea, ot the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. Neither party appeared in person nor 
through counsel. liie court having received affidavits and 
memoranda, and being duly advised in the premises now makes =r i 
enters the following 
ORDER 
1 Defendants' motion is treated i: a Motion for 
Summary Judgment as a result of matters outside the pleadings being 
presented to the Court. Such motion is hereby granted by the 
Court. Plaintiff is awarded nothing as a result of this action. 
° Defendants are awarded attorney's fees in the amount 
cf£ $250.00. 
DATED t h i s / / > ^ d a y of September, 1993 
tCSTTTFY THAT TW'S IS A TRUE COPY OF AM 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRO 
DISTRICT COURT. SALT 1 HKE COUNTY. STATE 
7
 / DEPUTY COURT CtERK ' * 
RULE 4-504 CERTIFICATE 
The u n d e r s i g n e d h e r e b y c e r t i f i e s t h a t h e m a i l e d a t r u e and 
c o r r e c t copy o f t h e f o r e g o i n g document t o c o u n s e l f o r Defendant , a t 
t h e a d d r e s s shown hereunder v i a f i r s t - c l a s s m a i l , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d 
on t h i s _ _ _ _ _ _ day o f September, 1993 • The u n d e r s i g n e d f u r t h e r 
r e q u e s t s t h a t t h e Order be s i g n e d and e n t e r e d a s s u b m i t t e d p u r s u a n t 
t o Rule 4 -504 of t h e Code of J u d i c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a t t h e 
e x p i r a t i o n of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t ime* 
L o w e l l V. Summerhays 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
6400 Commerce Park 
448 E a s t 6400 S o u t h , S u i t e 314 
Murray, UT 84107 
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